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STATE v. GALIO: AN ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH?

Recent decisions by New Mexico and federal courts in cases involving challenges to the constitutionality of warrantless searches and
inspections' will have a broad impact on statutorily authorized
searches by state agencies. In two cases 2 the challenge stemmed from
an employer's refusal to submit to a warrantless administrative inspection pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of

1970 (hereinafter OSHA). 3 In another case, State v. Galio,4 the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that a warrantless police search of an
automobile repair garage conducted pursuant to apparent statutory
authority was unconstitutional. Galio was decided on the basis of the
OSHA cases and on the basis of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.,' even though the facts differed
from those present in the OSHA cases. This casenote will briefly
examine the import of the Galio decision in light of the law which
has evolved in the area of administrative searches since 1967 when
the United States Supreme Court decided two important cases involving such searches. 6
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The constitutional challenge to a warrantless nonconsensual ad-

ministrative search is grounded on the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. 7 In the typical criminal case a search
1. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976); State ex rel.
Environmental Improvement Agency v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 91 N.M. 125, 571 P.2d
117 (1977); State v. Galio, 92 N.M.
-, 587 P.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1978).
2. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976); State ex rel.
Environmental Improvement Agency v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 91 N.M. 125,571 P.2d
117 (1977).
3. 29 U.S.C. §657(a) (1970).
4. 92 N.M.
-, 587 P.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1978).
5. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
6. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967).
7. U.S. Const. Amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons and
things to be seized.
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is unreasonable if conducted without probable cause.8 The Fourth
Amendment's protection of individual privacy from arbitrary governmental intrusions is achieved by broadly prohibiting the issuance of
search warrants except on a showing of probable cause. The requirement of a warrant ensures that an impartial judicial officer has determined that, based on police evidence, probable cause to believe that
an offense has been or is being committed does exist.9
Administrative searches and inspections, on the other hand, are
usually conducted pursuant to statutory and regulatory schemes
which typically lack a warrant procedure ensuring an impartial
screening for reasonableness. Even where a warrant might be obtained, agencies will rarely have the particularized probable cause
required for a criminal search warrant. The Supreme Court has developed two lines of cases in dealing with the problems associated with
administrative searches. In one line of cases, the Court balances the
governmental need to make the inspection against the extent of the
intrusion. In these cases the result of the balancing is a finding that a
nonconsensual search is reasonable if made pursuant to an "administrative" search warrant. In the alternative line of cases, actually constituting more of an exception for unique situations, the Court finds
that the government's interest in making certain warrantless inspections so outweighs the search's invasion of protected privacy interests
that a carefully restricted warrantless search is reasonable.
The 1967 companion cases Camara v. Municipal Court1 0 and See
v. City of Seattle1' and the recent decision in Marshall v. Barlow's
Inc.' 2 establish the first line of cases. In the Camara and See cases
8. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970).
9. In United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972), the Court
stated that investigation and enforcement officials should not be the sole judges in determining when governmental intrusions are required. Rather, protection of Constitutional
freedoms is best served by leaving this determination to a disinterested and neutral magistrate. See also, Aguilar v. State of Texas, 387 U.S. 108 (1964).
10. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara a San Francisco housing inspector making a routine
annual inspection for possible violations of the city's housing code was refused entry upon
presentation of his credentials. Camara challenged the resulting imposition of penalties
authorized by the city code. The Court found that the traditional safeguards of the Fourth
Amendment, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, barred such
warrantless inspections. The Court also outlined the requirements for issuance of a new type
of administrative search warrant.
11. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). In See, a fire department inspector was refused access to a
locked commercial warehouse. The applicable city ordinance provided criminal sanctions for
refusing to permit such warrantless fire inspections. The Court fotind that the Fourth
Amendment's protections extend to private commercial property and concluded that a
suitable administrative warrant is required for nonconsensual administrative searches of such
business premises.
12. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
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the Supreme Court held that local officials authorized under municipal codes to conduct routine health and safety inspections are required to obtain an administrative warrant to inspect both residential
and commercial property when consent to a warrantless inspection is
denied. The Court viewed this warrant requirement for agency inspections as consistent with the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment to "safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by government officials."' ' The Camara Court
initially found that recognizable Fourth Amendment interests were
implicated in health and safety inspections. The Court then engaged
in a balancing of the governmental interest in preventing the development of conditions harmful to public health and safety against the
extent of the intrusion of such inspections on protected privacy
interests. The Court concluded that such inspections were reasonable
if conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued upon different criteria than required for criminal search warrants.' ' In the Court's
view, the warrant requirement addressed the problem of the occupant who has "no way of knowing whether enforcement of the
municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way
of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and
no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under
proper authorization."' '
The Court in Camara briefly discussed the question of appropriate
standards for issuance of search warrants for such administrative
searches. Whereas particularized probable cause must exist for issuance of a warrant in a criminal case, the Court in Camara said reasonableness should be the standard for issuance of administrative inspection warrants. The Court stated that determining reasonableness
required "balancing the need to search against the invasion which
the search entails."' 6 Thus, where a valid governmental interest jus13. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). The opinion clearly rejects
the argument that such administrative inspections violate merely peripheral Fourth Amendment interests, overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
14. 387 U.S. at 538. The Court found the following factors persuasive in concluding area
code-enforcement inspections were reasonable:
First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance....
Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would
achieve acceptable results ....Finally, because the inspections are neither
personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they
involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy.
Id. at 537. The Court further stated that the "only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all structures." Id. at 535-36.
15. Id. at 532.
16. Id
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tifies an inspection, a properly limited area inspection warrant may
issue even where probable cause in the traditional criminal sense does
not exist. A limited area inspection warrant can be issued "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area
inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling."' I The
Court included as examples of administrative standards, "the passage
of time, the nature of the building (e.g. a multi-family apartment
house) or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling."' ' However, in See the Court reserved for decision
on a case-by-case basis the validity of regulatory inspections conducted as part of licensing programs.1 9
In the Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. case, an agent of the Secretary of
Labor sought entry to the nonpublic work area of an electrical and
plumbing installation business in order to make a safety inspection
pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.20 He
lacked a warrant and consent was denied. The Supreme Court held
that nonconsensual warrantless OSHA inspections are in fact unreasonable. In reaching its conclusion the Court rejected the government's argument that the intrusion of an OSHA inspection was minimal and that the government's interest in conducting the inspection
was of such importance that the search was reasonable without a
warrant. The government's position was based on the fact that prior
federal health and safety regulation of interstate businesses as well as
extensive governmental involvement in labor relations operated to
reduce a business' expectations of privacy. The government also
argued that agency restrictions on the scope of OSHA inspections
reduced its intrusiveness and permitted such inspections to meet the
Fourth Amendment's requirement that the search be reasonable. In
support of the government's alleged need to conduct warrantless
inspections, the Secretary of Labor argued that surprise was a neces17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
387 U.S. at 456.
29 U.S.C. §657(a) (1976) provides:
...the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant,
establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment
where work is performed by an employee of an employer, and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other
reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any
such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines,
apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately
any such employer, owner, operator, agent or employee.
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sary element for proper enforcement of the Act. The Secretary further argued that a warrant requirement would result in an increase in
denials of consent to warrantless inspections which in turn would
create additional administrative burdens resulting from having to
obtain warrants. The Court found, however, that the balance of the
competing governmental and private interests did not weigh in favor
of warrantless OSHA inspections. The Court concluded that issuance
of an OSHA warrant would not require demonstrating probable
cause to believe that conditions in violation of OSHA existed at the
business to be inspected. Rather, the Court said that a valid warrant
could issue upon a "showing that a specific business has been chosen
for an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for
the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for
example, dispersion of employees in various types of industries
across a given area, and the desired frequency of searches in any of
the lesser divisions of the area."' I Following the decision in Camara,
the Court thus recognized that the reduced probable cause requirements for administrative search warrants were applicable to OSHA
inspections.
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States2 2 and United States
v. Biswell,2' the other line of administrative search cases, the Supreme Court created an exception to the Camara-See-Biswell rule
requiring warrants for nonconsensual administrative inspections. In
this second line of cases, licensing programs requiring a business to
submit to warrantless inspections as a condition to operation were
challenged. In both Colonnade and Biswell the Court found administrative search warrants for such nonconsensual agency searches unnecessary. In Colonnade federal agents suspecting liquor law violations entered a catering establishment's locked liquor storeroom
without consent and without a warrant. The Court noted that federal
law provided for warrantless entry and inspection of the premises of
retail liquor dealers. 2 4 Both the majority and the dissent found such
a statutorily sanctioned warrantless entry and inspection reasonable.2 The Court based its decision on the long history of governmental regulation of the liquor industry.
In Biswell the Court held that a warrantless search of a locked
storeroom, authorized under the Gun Control Act of 1968,26 which
21. 436 U.S. at 321.
22. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
23. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
24. 26 U.S.C. §5146(b) (1976).
25. 397 U.S. at 76-77. The majority, unlike the dissent, was not willing to find that the
statute authorized forcible, warrantless entries.
26. 18 U.S.C. § §921-28 (1976).
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resulted in the seizure of unlicensed sawed-off rifles from a federally
licensed gun dealer was not unreasonable. While the Court noted that
federal regulation of firearms was "not as deeply rooted in history as
is governmental control of the liquor industry,"'7 it did find that
federal firearm regulation "is undeniably of central importance to
federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in
2
regulating the firearms traffic within their borders." 8 The Court
reached its conclusion that such warrantless inspections were reasonable partly because "inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy." 2 9 In the Biswell case a finding of reduced
expectations of privacy resulted from the fact that a firearms dealer
'
was a federally licensed and "pervasively regulated business, "30
whose "business records, firearms, and ammunition [were] subject
to effective inspection." 3 1 The Court also specifically noted that the
regulatory inspection scheme under the Gun Control Act strictly
limited the time, place, and scope of inspections.' 2 Although these
limitations figured in the Camara opinion's suggested calculus for
3
determining whether administrative search warrants should issue,
Biswell held such limitations on the scope of inspection essential to
the validity of an administrative search. In fact, the Court said that
the legality of regulatory inspection schemes which carefully limit in
time, place, and scope authorized searches depends not on consent,
'
"but on the authority of a valid statute." ' By viewing the Biswell
warrantless inspection as reasonable, the Court was not required to
discuss appropriate standards for issuance of an administrative warrant.
It seems clear that the Supreme Court views the Colonnade-Biswell
type situation as the exception and has subsequently declined opportunities to expand the doctrine." 5 The Court in Barlow in fact char27. 406 U.S. at 315.
28. Id.
29. Id at 316.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. Id at 315.
33. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
34. 406 U.S. at 315. It has been suggested that the Court did not abandon the flexible
standard of probable cause announced in Camara; rather it must be inferred. Weissberg,
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Are Warrantless Routine OSHA Inspections A Violation of the
Fourth Amendment?, 6 Envt'l. Aff. 423, 432 (1978). Other commentators suggest that in
-disclaiming the need for consent, the Court meant only that actual consent at the time of
inspection was unnecessary since the licensee impliedly consented to such inspections when
the license was issued. McManis and McManis, Structuring Administrative Inspections: Is
There Any WarrantForA Search Warrant?, 26 Am. U. L. Rev. 942, 950-51 (1977).
35. See notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text infra.
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acterized Colonnade and Biswell as representing "responses to relatively unique circumstances." 3 6
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES: NEW MEXICO DECISIONS
The New Mexico cases involving administrative searches were
decided in light of the foregoing Supreme Court decisions. The first
case, Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises,Inc.,3 ' involved a challenge to
OSHA regulations which permitted nonconsensual administrative inspections to check for compliance with health and safety standards
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.3 8 OSHA representatives
seeking to conduct a routine inspection and apparently acting without reason to suspect violations were denied entry to the Hertzler
premises. Application was subsequently made to a federal magistrate
for an inspection warrant. In support of the Secretary of Labor's
petition for an order compelling inspection, the government argued
that it was not required to obtain a warrant to make an OSHA
inspection since such inspections fell within the Colonnade-Biswell
exception. Hertzler, on the other hand, asserted both the necessity of
a warrant under the Fourth Amendment and the constitutional deficiency of the inspection warrant which OSHA officials actually obtained. Hertzler claimed the magistrate had issued the inspection
warrant without a showing of probable cause. 3 9 The court construed
the Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement narrowly. It found recent Supreme Court pronouncements in AlmeidaSanchez v. United States4" and Air Pollution Variance Board v.
Western Alfalfa Corp.4 1 reaffirmed the general vitality and applicability of Camara and See.
36. 436 U.S.

at

313.

37. 418 F. Supp. 623 (D.N.M. 1976).
38. See note 20 supra.
39. 418 F. Supp. at 629. In footnote 3, at 629, the court stated:
The warrant application included only a recitation of the OSHA inspection
provisions as authority for the proposed inspection plus statements to the effect
that inspection of Hertzler was necessary to determine its compliance with
OSHA and that OSHA inspectors previously had been denied entry at Hertzler. The warrant itself contained a conclusory assertion that reasonable legislative standards had been proposed for the inspection pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§657(a) (1976).
40. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). A warrantless automobile stop and search conducted by roving
Border Patrol officers pursuant to federal statutory authority permitting such stops and
searches within 100 miles of the border to check for illegal aliens was held unconstitutional.
The Court found that the warrantless searches, conducted without probable cause or consent, "embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that the
'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant prior to the
inspection." 413 U.S. at 270. The exceptions of Colonnade and Biswell were not applicable
since "the petitioner here was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business." Id. at 271.
41. 416 U.S. 861 (1974). A state health inspector entered the outdoor premises of the

.426
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The Hertzler opinion enumerated the factors which need to exist
for a warrantless inspection to be sustained under the narrow Colonnade-Biswell exception. 4 2 Since these factors were absent in the
Hertzler situation, the court concluded that a warrantless OSHA
inspection of the Hertzler premises was outside the Colonnade-Biswell
exception and therefore prohibited under Camara and See. The court
also noted that unlike the relatively limited scope of the administrative inspections sustained in Colonnade and Biswell, OSHA inspections embrace practically every private enterprise. The court decided
that Congress intended that OSHA "conduct nonconsensual inspections only pursuant to the authority of a warrant issued upon satisfaction of standards of probable cause which have been articulated in
the area of administrative searches."'4 The court concluded that the
federal magistrate's warrant was improperly issued because OSHA
had failed to meet the reduced probable cause requirements of an
administrative search.4 4
On the basis of the decision in Hertzler and another federal case,4
the New Mexico Supreme Court in State ex rel. Environmental Improvement Agency v. Albuquerque Publishing Co.4 6 held that a state
agency, authorized to conduct OSHA health and safety inspections,
must obtain a warrant to make a nonconsensual administrative inspection of the premises of a publishing company. The court said
that,
plant without the company's knowledge or consent to test the smoke emitted from the
plant's chimneys. The Court reaffirmed the principles of Camara and See but sustained the
inspection under the theory that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to sights seen in
the open fields. 416 U.S. at 865.
42. The Hertzler court gave this summary of the relevant factors:
First, the enterprise sought to be inspected must be engaged in a pervasively
regulated business. The presence of this factor insures that warrantless inspections will pose only a minimal threat to justifiable expectations of privacy.
Second, warrantless inspection must be a crucial part of a regulatory scheme
designed to further an urgent federal interest. And third, the inspection must
be conducted in accord with a statutorily authorized procedure, itself carefully limited as to time, place, and scope. The presence of this factor guards
against the possibility that any inspection right will be abused.
418 F. Supp. at 631-632 (footnotes omitted).
43. 418 F. Supp. at 634. The court folowed the decision in Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976). In Gibson's Products the court held that 29
U.S.C. §657(a) authorizing entries without delay, "was intended by Congress to authorize
objected-to OSHA inspections only when made by a search warrant issued by a United
States Magistrate or other judicial officer of the third branch under probable cause standards
appropriate to administrative searches-that is, in a constitutional manner." 407 F. Supp. at
162. Contra, Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974)
(sustaining the constitutionality of nonconsensual warrantless OSHA inspections).
44. 418 F. Supp. at 634. See text accompanying note 37 supra for the court's discussion
of the warrant application.
45. Usery v. Centrif-Air Machine Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
46. 91 N.M. 125, 571 P.2d 117 (1977).
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a non-consensual, warrantless administrative inspection of business
premises can be made only when: (1) the enterprise sought to be
inspected is engaged in a business pervasively regulated by state or
federal government; (2) the inspection will pose only a minimal
threat to justifiable expectations of privacy; (3) the warrantless inspection is a crucial part of a regulatory scheme designed to further
an urgent government interest; and (4) the inspection is carefully
limited as to time, place and scope.4 7
Using the first element of the test, the court found that the state
agency failed to meet its burden of showing that the publishing
business qualified as an industry subject to pervasive governmental
regulation. 4 ' Thus, the inapplicability of the Colonnade-Biswell
exception to the warrant requirement led the court to conclude that
the state agency must "obtain a search warrant based upon a preliminary finding of probable cause by a judicial officer before being
allowed to inspect the premises involved.' 9 The court did not discuss what type of showing of probable cause was required for issuance of the warrant. This absence of discussion may have occurred
because the court viewed the question on appeal to be whether the
district court properly refused to grant an order compelling a warrantless administrative inspection." 0
STATE v. GALIO
In State v. Galio' 1 a warrantless police search of an automobile
repair garage resulted in the seizure of evidence leading to criminal
convictions for violation of motor vehicle statutes. The statutes
which were violated prohibited the dismantling of motor vehicles
without a license, the possession of vehicles lacking manufacturer's
identification numbers, and the receiving or transferring of stolen
5
vehicles. The inspection was made pursuant to statutory authority 2
47. Id at 125, 571 P.2d at 117. These four criteria are nearly identically stated in Usery
v. Centrif-Air Machine Co., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 959, 961 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
48. 91 N.M. at 125-26, 571 P.2d at 117-18. Failure to satisfy this first test was found
determinative on the question of the reasonableness of nonconsensual, warrantless inspections in both the Hertzler and Centrif-Air Machine cases.
49. Id at 126, 571 P.2d at 118.
50. In both the Hertzler and Centrif-Air Machine cases, cited and approved by the court,
the standard for probable cause was deemed to be that for administrative searches, as set out
in Camera and See.
51. 92 N.M.
-, 587 P.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1978).
52. N.M. Stat. Ann. §64-2-14 (Repl. 1972) provides:
64-2-14. Police authority of division.-The commissioner and such officers,
deputies and inspectors of the division as he shall designate by the issuance of
credentials shall have the powers:
(a) Of peace officers for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this act;
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which granted the Commissioner of the Department of Motor
Vehicles the power to inspect vehicles at public garages and repair
shops "for the purpose of locating stolen vehicles and investigating
the title and registration thereof."' '
The defendant Galio operated a repair shop and was the employer
of a codefendant, Cruz. The challenged inspection of the premises of
the defendant's repair garage was made by members of the Albuquerque Police Department's Auto Theft Division who were deputized as
inspectors of the New Mexico Department of Motor Vehicles.5 4 Although not mentioned in the court's opinion, the record indicates
that the police had information prior to making the search that a
stolen truck was purchased from Cruz at Galio's business address.5 s
As part of their search of cars belonging to both the defendant and
third party customers, the police opened car doors, looked into glove
boxes, raised hoods and raised cars on hoists and looked under them
for numbers.5 6
The circumstances of the search prompted the court to note that
it was not "concerned with a consent search or with probable cause
to search."' I The court was, however, concerned with the constitutionality of an unusual warrantless police search-one conducted pursuant to express statutory authority. The challenged Galio search did
resemble the usual administrative search in having legislative sanction. 5 8

(b) To make arrests upon view and without warrant for any violation committed in their presence of any of the provisions of this act;
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief that any vehicle is being operated
in violation of any provision of this act, to require the driver thereof to stop
and exhibit his driver's license and the registration evidence issued for the
vehicle and submit to an inspection of such vehicle, the registration plates, and
registration evidence thereon or to an inspection and test of the equipment of
such vehicle;
(d) Inspect any vehicle of a type required to be registered hereunder in any
public garage or repair shop or in any place where such vehicles are held for
sale or wrecking, for the purpose of locating stolen vehicles and investigating
the title and registration thereof;
(e) To determine by inspection that all dealers and wreckers of vehicles are
in compliance with the provisions of this act with particular reference to but
not limited to the requirements for an established place of business and for
records.
This section is now N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-2-12 (1978). There are minor changes in the new
section.
53. Id.
54. State's Answer Brief at 1.
55. Defendant's Brief-In-Chief at 1.
56. Id
, 587 P.2d at 45.
57. 92 N.M. at
58. Generally, criminal searches by police for fruits and evidence of crime are not conducted pursuant to express statutory or regulatory authority, though administrative searches
usually are. But see, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Border Patrol
searches statutorily sanctioned).
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The Galio opinion referred to the test set out in Albuquerque
Publishing for determining whether the statute authorizing the search
fulfilled the requirements of a warrantless administrative search. The
court specifically discussed application of the third requirement for
such a search-whether the warrantless inspection was a crucial part
to a regulatory scheme designed to further an urgent governmental
interest. The court applied this test by first quoting a statement of
legislative purpose found elsewhere in the motor vehicle statutes s 9
which the court stated was "similar" '6 0 to OSHA policy.6 1 The
court noted that in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.6 2 the Supreme Court
held warrantless OSHA inspections to be unreasonable. 6 3 With this
as authority, the Galio court concluded that no "urgent government
interest would be served by a warrantless inspection." 6 4 The court
thus held the warrantless search of Galio's garage unconstitutional
since it was made without a warrant.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals in deciding Galio was not
presented with the argument that the challenged search may actually
have been a criminal search rather than an administrative inspection.
However, with increasingly pervasive governmental regulation and
compliance inspections, it seems likely that challenges to govern59. The court quoted the following from N.M. Stat. Ann. §64-37-1 (Supp. 1975) [now
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-16-1 (1978)] :
...The distribution and sale of motor vehicles in this state vitally affects the
general economy of the state and the public interest and welfare of its citizens.
It is the policy of this state and the purpose of this act [64-37-1 to 64-37-16]
to exercise the state's police power to ensure a sound system of distributing
and selling motor vehicles and regulating the manufacturers, distributors, representatives and dealers of those vehicles to provide for compliance with
manufacturer's warranties, and to prevent frauds, unfair practices, discriminations, impositions and other abuses of our Citizens.
92 N.M. at -, 587 P.2d at 46.
60. 92 N.M. at
, 587 P.2d at 46.
61. The court quoted the following from 29 U.S.C. §651 (1970):
"(a) The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of
work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to,
interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses,
and disability compensation payments.
"(b) The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the
exercise of its powers to regulate commerce among the several States and with
foreign nations and to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources-"
92 N.M. at -, 587 P.2d at 46.
62. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
63. The Barlow opinion reached its conclusion that nonconsensual OSHA inspections
require a warrant without any reference to the OSHA policy statute from which the Galio
opinion quoted. The Court in Barlow basically followed the Camara and See type approach:
a balancing of the interests involved to determine whether warrantless OSHA inspections
were reasonable.
64. 92 N.M. at
-, 587 P.2d at 46.
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mental inspections may be decided on the distinction between criminal and administrative searches. Criminal search warrants may only
be issued upon a showing of particularized probable cause; the re-

quirements for issuance of an administrative search warrant, however, are significantly lower. Future searches conducted pursuant to
an administrative warrant may be challenged on the ground that the
search was criminal and conducted without the requisite probable
cause.
Had the court in Galio squarely faced the question of whether the
search was an administrative or a criminal search, it may have found
helpful the balancing test suggested by the Camara-See-Barlowline of
cases. In any weighing of the competing governmental and private

interests, the fact that the search of Galio's garage was conducted by
uniformed police officers acting upon a tip and looking for fruits and
evidence of criminal activity would probably be significant. Inevitably, such a search is more hostile than that conducted by an agency
inspector. 6 ' Also significant is the purpose of the statute authorizing

the Galio search. Most administrative inspections seek to check for
compliance with health and safety regulations. 6" The stated purpose

65. The Camara opinion, while recognizing the Fourth Amendment's applicability to
both regulatory inspections and criminal searches, does seem to suggest that one method of
distinguishing them might be the level of the hostility of the governmental intrusion. "We
may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less
hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of
crime. For this reason alone, Frank differed from the great bulk of Fourth Amendment
cases which have been considered by this Court." 387 U.S. at 530.
In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), the Court sustained a challenged municipal
inspection ordinance which, like the one in Camara, permitted warrantless inspections of
private property to enforce health codes. Frank distinguished the challenged municipal
health inspection from the normal criminal search and detailed the factors making it a less
hostile intrusion. In such administrative searches "no evidence for criminal prosecution is
sought to be seized ... the inspection is conducted with due regard for every convenience of
time and place ... the inspector has no power to force entry and did not attempt it. A fine
is imposed for resistance, but officials are not authorized to break past the unwilling occupant." 359 U.S. at 366-67. This key distinction made in Frank between normal criminal
searches and administrative inspection-the basis of its holding that merely peripheral
Fourth Amendment interests are involved in such administrative inspections-formed part of
the legal background against which Carnara was decided. In fact, the distinction supports
Camara's lowering of the probable cause threshold for administrative warrants. Camara
overruled Frank by finding that administrative searches do implicate protected privacy
interests. Presumably the Frank distinction between criminal and administrative searches
remains viable in post-Camara analysis. See, e.g. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971)
(Reduced hostility of caseworker's warrantless visit to welfare recipient's home was a factor
in Court's sustaining the inspection).
66. For instance the Supreme Court said this of OSHA inspections: "The purpose of the
search is to inspect for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations." Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 309 (1978). The inspection in Camarawas "aimed at securing
city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for private property." 387 U.S. at
535. And the See inspection "was conducted as part of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass
to obtain compliance with Seattle's Fire Code." 387 U.S. at 541.
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of the statute authorizing the Galio search, in contrast, is location of
stolen vehicles6 7 -a clear search for evidence of crime. Another significant factor in any balancing test is the fact that the level of the
governmental intrusion is at least arguably greater in Galio than in
the usual administrative search.' 8 The police examination of the
vehicles at Galio's repair shop was indeed extensive.6 9 It represented
not only a very real threat to the defendants of subsequent criminal
prosecution, but also a significant invasion of the privacy of the third
party vehicle owners. Another useful factor to a court's balancing
might be the level of sanction involved.° Galio was convicted at
trial of fourth degree felonies.'
Such severe criminal penalties
would seem to distinguish the Galio case from the more common
administrative inspection cases.
The Galio opinion lacks express recognition that nonconsensual
searches are generally unreasonable unless authorized by a valid warrant. 2 The opinion eschews balancing the challenged search's utility
against the extent of its intrusion to determine its reasonableness.
Such a conscious balancing might have forced the court to consider
whether the challenged search was administrative or criminal. Such
balancing would have required consideration of the rather extensive
invasion of Galio's protected privacy interests to accomplish a governmental purpose arguably of the same dimension as the governmental purpose underlying typical criminal searches.' I
Use of the Albuquerque Publishing test permitted the court to
determine whether the Galio inspection fell within the narrow Colonnade-Biswell exception to the prohibition on nonconsensual warrant67. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
68. The extent of governmental intrusion was certainly considered by the Court in
Camara. There the reasonableness of code enforcement area inspections was upheld. "[B ecause the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence
of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." 387 U.S.
at 537.
69. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
70. No Court seems to have expressly used this factor. However, Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309, 325 (1971) by analogy seems to support this proposition. The refusal in Wyman
to permit a welfare caseworker's home visit was not a criminal act under any applicable state
or federal statute. Instead, such refusal only resulted in termination of benefits. The Supreme Court's consideration of such a sanction was a factor it relied upon in finding that the
caseworker's warrantless visit to the home of the recipient did not constitute an unreasonable search.
71. Fourth degree felonies carry penalties of imprisonment for not less than one nor
more than five years, or the payment of a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or
both such imprisonment and fine in the discretion of the judge.
72. "[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
73. See notes 63-67 and accompanying text supra.
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less administrative searches. But, by beginning its analysis with this
test, the court made an assumption that the search was an administrative inspection. The Albuquerque Publishing test is relevant only
after a search has been found to be an administrative search. Once
the court decided the inspection of Galio's repair shop did not meet
the Albuquerque Publishing test, it considered briefly the appropriate probable cause standard. The court found that "probable
cause in the criminal law sense is not required." 7" This determination logically followed from the unquestioned assumption that the
search was an administrative inspection since administrative inspections do not require the traditional particularized search warrant
issued only upon a showing of probable cause. The full impact of the
court's assumption that the Galio search was an administrative inspection is, therefore, that the probable cause threshold is relaxed for
inspections that may well be statutorily sanctioned criminal searches.
CONCLUSION

Analysis by the Supreme Court of a challenged search focuses on
deciding whether the search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This involves balancing the extent of the search's invasion of
protected privacy interests against the governmental need to conduct
the search. Thus, where the intrusion is limited and the government's
need to conduct the noncriminal search to effectuate important public policies is great, the Court has held in the Camara-See-Barlowline
of cases that searches made pursuant to a warrant issued on a showing of less than particularized probable cause are reasonable. The
Colonnade-Biswell line illustrates the limited situation where the balance so favors the governmental interests that even warrantless inspections are deemed reasonable.
New Mexico cases involving administrative searches have not been
decided by a similar process of considered weighing of the competing
interests. Instead of determining the reasonableness of the challenged
search, New Mexico courts have applied a four part test. This test is
useful in determining whether a challenged search falls within the
narrow Colonnade-Biswell exception, but it does not answer the
essential question of whether a search is reasonable. The Galio case
demonstrates the shortcomings of deciding challenges to searches by
applying this test rather than applying the balancing test used by the
Supreme Court.
JERRY DICKINSON
74. 92 N.M. at
the Barlow case.
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, 587 P.2d at 46. The court approvingly quotes this language from

